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In 1996, at a conference on the “Law of Cyberspace” held at the 
University of Chicago, Judge Frank Easterbrook famously asserted 
that the very concept of the “Law of Cyberspace” was as absurd as the 
“Law of the Horse.” In Easterbrook’s colorful account,  
 
Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people 
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing 
of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with 
prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a 
course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and 
to miss unifying principles.1  
 
Similarly, Easterbrook opined, it is misguided to treat cases involving 
the Internet as a distinct field of study. He offered the example of 
intellectual property in cyberspace, which, he said, is just the law of 
intellectual property applied to cyberspace. Instead of trying to “tailor 
the law to the subject,” Easterbrook advised the audience to 
concentrate on assessing whether our underlying legal principles are 
generally sound.2  
 
Congress, at least, did not heed Judge Easterbrook’s warning. In the 
same year that Judge Easterbrook delivered these remarks, Congress 
passed the Communications Decency Act, which attempted to regulate 
pornographic content on the Internet. While nearly all of the Act was 
struck down3 by the Supreme Court for violating the First 
Amendment, one part, now popularly known as Section 230, 
remained.  
 
Section 230 limits how and when online intermediaries (“interactive 
computer services”) can be held legally accountable for the actions of 
those who use their platforms and services.4 Subject to exceptions for 
violations of federal criminal law and intellectual property law, 
“providers or users of an interactive computer service,” as the statute 
 
 
 
 
1 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 
207 (1996). 
2 Id. at 208. 
3 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
4 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
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called them, are not liable for content created by other users.5 This is 
the law that protects social media giants like Facebook and Twitter 
from being sued for posts on their platforms and ensures that media 
outlets aren’t legally responsible for content in their comments 
sections. In the view of Section 230 enthusiasts, it is the law that 
makes the Internet the most powerful medium of free expression.  
 
Section 230 is considered so central to the development of the Internet 
and so essential to its continued operation that it has been called the 
“Magna Carta of the Internet,”6 the “foundation of the Internet,” “the 
First Amendment of the Internet,”7 and the “cornerstone of Internet 
freedom.”8 It has also been called “The One Law That’s The Cause Of 
Everything Good And Terrible About The Internet”9 as well as “the 
most dangerous law on the books right now.”10  For better or for 
worse, Section 230 is, quite literally, the Law of Cyberspace.  
 
While intense support by powerful entities ensured that the law 
remained unchanged for more than twenty years, the tide has recently 
begun to turn. In 2018, Congress amended the law for the first time, 
curtailing its protections with regard to online content relating to sex 
trafficking. This amendment was severely criticized by Section 230 
advocates, who maintain that further tinkering may spell the end of 
 
 
 
 
5 Id. 
6 Noa Yachot, The ‘Magna Carta’ of Cyberspace Turns 20: An Interview With the ACLU 
Lawyer Who Helped Save the Internet, ACLU (June 23, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu 
.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/magna-carta-cyberspace-turns-20-interview-aclu-
lawyer-who-helped [https://perma.cc/72VC-FDCX]. 
7 Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet's First Amendment. Now Both 
Republicans and Democrats Want To Take It Away, REASON (July 29, 2019, 8:01 AM), 
https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-now-both-
republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ [https://perma.cc/2KXL-QPFG]. 
8 Berin Szoka, Section 230: The Cornerstone of Internet Freedom, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT 
(Aug. 18, 2009), https://techliberation.com/2009/08/18/section-230-the-cornerstone-of-
internet-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/R3YU-QL9P]. 
9 Paul Blumenthal, The One Law That’s The Cause Of Everything Good And Terrible About 
The Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/ent 
ry/online-harassment-section230_n_5b4f5cc1e4b0de86f488df86 [https://perma.cc/XL7X-
TEGM]. 
10 Clare Duffy, Marc Benioff Says It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, CNN BUS. (Oct. 17, 2019, 
7:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/16/tech/salesforce-marc-benioff-break-up-facebook-
boss-files/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9US-5MAX]. 
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free speech, democracy, and the Internet itself. Critics counter that 
Section 230 has led to a dysfunctional marketplace of ideas and the 
erosion of democratic values. Calls to amend the law, from across the 
political spectrum, have increased in the last few years and have been 
met with vociferous opposition.11 As Professor Jeff Kosseff, author of 
a book on Section 230 titled The Twenty-Six Words That Created the 
Internet, noted in August of 2019, “[t]here is definitely more attention 
being paid to Section 230 than at any time in its history.”12  
 
Some of this attention has been in patently bad faith. A number of 
high-profile politicians have claimed, for example, that the law 
requires online intermediaries to be “neutral platforms” or lose their 
immunity,13 a claim unsupported by the text of the statute or case law 
interpreting it.14 Such willful misreading for political gain, however, 
should not distract from the legitimate scrutiny being applied to the 
influential law two decades after its passage.  
 
In creating the Law of Cyberspace, Congress did the opposite of what 
Judge Easterbook had urged: rather than clarifying existing legal 
principles—in particular, principles of immunity, complicity, free 
speech, criminal law, or tort—in light of technological advances and 
applying those principles to Internet cases, Congress effectively 
upended all those principles in order to accommodate the supposedly 
exceptional nature of the Internet.  
 
Of particular concern is how Section 230 has been interpreted to 
eradicate the concept of collective responsibility, to obliterate the 
distinction between speech and conduct, and to provide a boon to 
 
 
 
 
11 Cristiano Lima, How a Widening Political Rift Over Online Liability is Splitting 
Washington, POLITICO (July 9, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/ 
9/online-industry-immunity-section-230-1552241 [https://perma.cc/USB3-TW3Z]. 
12 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shield for Websites Rattles Under Onslaught of Hate Speech, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/technology/section-230-
hate-speech.html. 
13 Sarah Jeong, Politicians Want to Change the Internet’s Most Important Law. They Should 
Read It First., N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/op 
inion/section-230-political-neutrality.html [https://perma.cc/D3WL-ZC35]. 
14 Jeff Kosseff, Correcting a Persistent Myth About the Law that Created the Internet, REG.      
REV. (July 15, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/15/kosseff-correcting-persistent-
myth-about-law-that-created-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/H8JS-J9UU]. 
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online entities over their offline counterparts. Courts have interpreted 
Section 230 to protect online classifieds sites from responsibility for 
advertising sex trafficking,15 online firearms sellers from responsibility 
for facilitating unlawful gun sales,16 and online marketplaces from 
responsibility for putting defective products into the stream of 
commerce.17  
 
The law of cyberspace, in other words, has unmade the law of real 
space. But careful consideration of Section 230’s history, evolution, 
and application demonstrate that this dystopian state of affairs is 
neither inevitable nor irremediable. The sweeping, destabilizing 
interpretation of Section 230 promoted by so many courts is not a 
faithful reflection of the text, goals, or intention of the statute. A better 
vision is both possible and necessary. 
 
The Internet of 1996 was markedly different than the Internet of 2019. 
In 1996, the World Wide Web had been in existence for only seven 
years, online commercial activity had only been allowed for four, and 
web browsers had become capable of displaying images for only three. 
Only 20 million American adults had Internet access, and these users 
spent less than 30 minutes a month online. “[W]hat’s striking about the 
old Web,” writes technology journalist Farhad Manjoo, “is how unsure 
everyone seemed to be about what the new medium was for.”18 
 
Compare that to July 2019, when more than 4 billion people—56% of 
the global population—were active Internet users.19 The United States 
has the third-highest number of Internet users in the world: 293 million 
 
 
 
 
15 E.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016). 
16 E.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 2019 WI 47, 386 Wis. 2d 449 N.W.2d 710, cert. denied, No. 
19-153, 2019 WL 6257416 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2019). 
17 E.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part, 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated en banc, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019). 
18 Farhad Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009, 5:33 PM), https://slate.com/techn 
ology/2009/02/the-unrecognizable-internet-of-1996.html [https://perma.cc/X9SY-L3EF]. 
19 J. Clement, Global Digital Population as of July 2019 (in millions), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/ 
[https://perma.cc/EML5-J4AA]. 
2020] FRANKS 15 
 
 
users, or 87% of its population.20 People now use the Internet not only 
to communicate, including via email, text message, and social media 
networks, but also to buy and sell merchandise, deposit checks, make 
restaurant reservations, watch videos, read books, stream music, and 
look for employment.21 Today, there is almost no aspect of most 
people’s daily lives that does not have an online component. 
“Cyberspace” is no longer a realm distinct or separable from physical 
space; the offline and online worlds are inextricably linked.  
 
Section 230 played a key role in the explosion of the Internet’s 
influence. Section 230’s operative clause, subsection (c), is titled 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive 
material.”22 This title suggests that Section 230 is meant to provide 
“Good Samaritan” immunity in much the same sense as offline “Good 
Samaritan” laws. Such laws do not create a duty to aid—unlike the law 
of many other countries, there is no general obligation under U.S. law 
to render assistance to strangers in distress, subject to a few 
exceptions—but instead provide immunity to people who, despite 
having no legal obligation to do so, attempt to aid others in distress.23 
These laws, which exist in every state, recognize that the lack of legal 
requirement to offer assistance combined with potential punishment 
for offering such punishment creates serious disincentives to offer 
such aid.24 While Good Samaritan laws cannot require people to offer 
assistance, they can encourage people to assist by removing the threat 
of liability for doing so. 
 
Why did Congress think that the Internet needed a Good Samaritan 
law? Two early Internet cases help explain Congress’s concerns. In a 
 
 
 
 
20 J. Clement, Internet Usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Aug. 20, 
2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/internet-usage-in-the-united-states/      
[https://perma.cc/NMM2-ANLC]. 
21 J. Clement, Most Popular Online Activities of Adult Internet Users in the United States as of 
November 2017, STATISTA (last edited Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
183910/internet-activities-of-us-users/ [https://perma.cc/76A4-G8Q6]. 
22 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
23 See, e.g., Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins. Co., 290 Wis. 2d 571, 714 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. 
2006). 
24 See id. at 191-92; see also Danny R. Veilleux, Construction and Application of “Good 
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294, § 2[a] (1989). 
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1991 case, a federal New York court found that an online 
communications service called CompuServe was not responsible for 
defamatory posts that appeared on one of its discussion forums.25  In 
defamation law, liability can be imposed on publishers as well as 
authors of libelous speech on the theory that publishers have 
knowledge of the content they publish. The court declined to treat 
CompuServe as a publisher because the communications service did 
not review the content it hosted.26 Therefore, the court found, the 
service was not responsible for unlawful content.27  
 
The web service Prodigy took a different approach to content posted 
by users than CompuServe. Prodigy marketed itself as a family-
friendly service, and made attempts to review and remove 
objectionable posts made to its message boards. In 1995, “wolf of 
Wall Street” Jordan Belfort sued Prodigy over allegedly libelous 
remarks made on online bulletin boards hosted by Prodigy. A state 
New York court found Prodigy liable for the defamatory content on 
the grounds that it, unlike CompuServe, had made an effort to review 
material posted to its services.28  
 
The two cases, taken together, seemed to stand for the proposition that 
online services that did nothing to address objectionable content would 
be rewarded, while those who attempted to intervene would be 
punished. Congress was concerned that rulings like this created a 
disincentive for online services to make efforts to moderate content—a 
worrisome result that could lead to the Internet becoming a cesspool of 
objectionable content.  
 
Accordingly, one clear purpose of Section 230 is simply to remove 
that disincentive. Subsection (c)(2) assures providers and users of 
interactive computer services that they will not be held liable with 
regard to any action “voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
 
 
 
 
25 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
26 Id. at 142-43. 
27 Id. 
28 Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, 4-5 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
2020] FRANKS 17 
 
 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable” or “taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict 
access” to such material.29 Given that it tracks the familiar legal 
principles of its namesake, subsection (c)(2) is the relatively 
uncontroversial portion of Section 230. Standing alone, this subsection 
of this “Good Samaritan” law does little more than apply an existing 
legal concept to the Internet.30  
 
Subsection 230(c)(1), on the other hand, has been interpreted in ways 
that not only are at odds with Good Samaritan laws, but also with a 
host of other legal principles and settled law. It is also the section that 
has proven most influential in the development of the Internet, “the 
twenty-six words that created the Internet,”31 to use Professor 
Kosseff’s phrase: “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”32  
 
To parse the meaning of this subsection, it is useful to recall, as 
mentioned above, that while U.S. law does not impose a general duty 
to aid, it does recognize a limited concept of shared responsibility for 
harm. In the physical world, third parties can sometimes be held 
criminally or civilly liable for other people’s actions. Many harmful 
acts are only possible with the participation of multiple actors with 
various motivations. The doctrines of aiding and abetting, complicity, 
and conspiracy all reflect the insight that third parties who assist, 
 
 
 
 
29 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018). 
30 Indeed, Subsection (c)(2) could be read as merely expressing a basic principle of First 
Amendment law. Most online intermediaries are private, as opposed to state, actors. As such, 
they have First Amendment rights that allow them to refuse to carry or promote speech against 
their will. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) 
(“[W]hen a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily 
constrained by the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor. The private 
entity may thus exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum.”); W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
31 Kosseff, supra note 14. 
32 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
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encourage, ignore, or contribute to the illegal actions of another person 
can and should be held responsible for their contributions to the harms 
that result, particularly if those third parties benefited in some material 
way from that contribution.  
 
Among the justifications for third-party liability in criminal and civil 
law is that this liability incentivizes responsible behavior. For 
example, it is a central tenet of tort law that the possibility of such 
liability incentivizes individuals and industries to act responsibly and 
reasonably. Conversely, granting of immunity from such liability risks 
encouraging negligent and reckless behavior.  
 
In sharp contrast to laws governing offline behavior, online 
intermediaries have been granted near-total immunity when their 
products, services, and platforms have been used to harm.33 Courts 
have interpreted Section 230(c)(1)’s prohibition on treating online 
intermediaries as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by their 
users very broadly. It has been read to provide sweeping immunity to 
message boards like 8chan (now 8kun), which provide a platform for 
mass shooters to spread terrorist propaganda, as well as to online 
firearms marketplaces such as Armslist, which facilitate the illegal sale 
of weapons used to murder domestic violence victims. It has even been 
used by Amazon to attempt to avoid responsibility for facilitating the 
sale of a defective dog leash that blinded a woman.34   
 
These online intermediaries are in no sense “Good Samaritans.”35 
They are not individuals who voluntarily intervene to prevent or 
mitigate harm caused by someone else. They are at best passive 
bystanders who do nothing to intervene against harm, and at worst, 
 
 
 
 
33 See Mary Anne Franks, Our Collective Responsibility for Mass Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
9. 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/mass-shooting-responsibility.html      
[https://perma.cc/TC43-SD8P]; Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet 
a Better Place. It Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-was-supposed-to-make-
the-internet-a-better-place-it-failed [https://perma.cc/8BW4-Q5HD].   
34 Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 151-52 (3d. Cir.), vacated, 936 F.3d 182 (3d. 
Cir. 2019).  
35 See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 416 (2017). 
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they are accomplices who profit from harm. If their conduct occurred 
offline, they could be held accountable for their role in causing harm. 
Why should the fact that it occurs online change this result?   
 
One answer that is sometimes offered is that the Internet is a medium 
of speech, and the First Amendment requires that regulations of speech 
must be much less burdensome than regulations of conduct. 
References to the importance of free speech in prefatory sections of 
Section 230 reinforce this point—“[t]he Internet and other interactive 
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad 
avenues for intellectual activity”36—as does the terminology of 
230(c)(2) of “publishers” and “speakers.”  
 
But this in some ways raises more questions than it answers. Much 
speech is not protected, or not fully protected, by the First 
Amendment. As the Court reiterated in U.S. v. Stevens, there are “well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”37 Even speech that is protected can be 
regulated in certain ways, including through theories such as 
distributor liability. It is not clear that Section 230’s prohibition of 
publisher liability must be read to preclude distributor liability, as the 
Fourth Circuit did in Zeran v. AOL.38  
 
But even more fundamentally, it is well past time to question whether 
the vast array of activities now conducted through the Internet can 
accurately or meaningfully be described as “speech.” One Section 230 
advocate has effusively described how the entire suite of products we 
think of as the Internet—search engines, social media, online 
publications with comments sections, Wikis, private message boards, 
matchmaking apps, job search sites, consumer review tools, digital 
marketplaces, Airbnb, cloud storage companies, podcast distributors, 
app stores, GIF clearinghouses, crowdsourced funding platforms, chat 
 
 
 
 
36 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2018). 
37 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (citing Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
38 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331-33 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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tools, email newsletters, online classifieds, video sharing venues, and 
the vast majority of what makes up our day-to-day digital 
experience—have benefited from the protections offered by 
Section 230.39    
 
But many of the offline cognates of the activities listed here would not 
be considered speech at all. While the Supreme Court takes a broad 
view of what counts as “speech” for the purpose of First Amendment 
protections,40 “[l]ike any other rule, the First Amendment does not 
regulate the full range of human behavior.”41 The First Amendment 
protects speech, not conduct. While some actions are sufficiently 
expressive to be considered speech for First Amendment purposes,42 
conduct is not automatically protected simply because it involves 
language in some way: “it has never been deemed an abridgement of 
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely 
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by 
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”43   
 
If Section 230’s rejection of settled principles of collective 
responsibility is justified on free speech grounds, then it should not be 
applied beyond the scope of what the First Amendment protects. But 
“courts routinely interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based 
on third-party content,” including “negligence; deceptive trade 
practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the common law 
privacy torts; tortious interference with contract or business relations; 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and dozens of other legal 
doctrines”44—coverage that well exceeds even the capacious 
boundaries of First Amendment doctrine. As Justice Powell worried in 
1978, “[w]hen the coverage of the First Amendment expands … there 
 
 
 
 
39 Brown, supra note 7. 
40 See generally MARK V. TUSHET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND 
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).  
41 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–18 (2015). 
42 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing 
of black armbands conveyed message regarding a matter of public concern). 
43 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). 
44 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. REFLECTION 33, 36-37 (2019). 
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is an increased possibility that, out of necessity, some of the existing 
doctrinal tools developed for a smaller area of coverage will have to be 
modified, possibly with unfortunate consequences.”45  
 
Yet another justification offered for Section 230’s grant of immunity 
to online intermediaries not available to their offline counterparts is 
scale. Online social media platforms, for example, deal with millions, 
sometimes billions, of pieces of content on a regular basis; no brick-
and-mortar bookstore approaches the number of transactions occurring 
on Amazon.com every hour. The sheer volume of this content would 
turn any duty of moderation into a Herculean effort.  
 
But it is not obvious why the enormity of scale should translate into 
less, rather than greater, responsibility for online intermediaries. For 
one, more activity means more potential for harm, and secondly, it is 
precisely the extraordinary scale of Internet activity that helps generate 
multi-billion-dollar profits—profits that could be put towards ensuring 
that this activity is reasonably regulated.46  
 
Section 230 establishes a dual regime of law, with one rule for offline 
conduct and another for online conduct. But once Section 230’s 
expansive immunity has been embraced, there is no clear reason to 
continue to restrict it to online activity. Offline entities can plausibly 
complain that the differential treatment afforded by broad 
interpretations of Section 230 violates principles of fairness and equal 
protection, or to put it more bluntly: if they can do it, why can’t we?  
 
It is well worth asking how the dystopian state of affairs created by 
Section 230 lives up to the parable of the Good Samaritan for which it 
is named? In the Biblical account, a man is set upon by robbers who 
beat him, steal his possessions, and leave him for dead. A priest comes 
 
 
 
 
45 Schauer, supra note 41, at 1635 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978)). 
46 See Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts:‘Zeran’s’ Legacy, LAW.COM: THE 
RECORDER (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:30 AM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecord 
er/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-on-stilts-zerans-legacy/?slreturn=20200117170709. 
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across him but “passe[s] by on the other side.”47 A Levite does the 
same. But the third man, the Samaritan, stops to help. He tends to the 
man’s wounds, takes him to an inn, and looks after him.  
 
The moral of the parable is generally understood to be that a “Good 
Samaritan” means helping another in need, even when one has no 
obligation to do so. Section 230(c)(2), like offline “Good Samaritan” 
laws, hews closely to this idea: providing immunity to those who 
voluntarily take on a duty to aid not demanded by law. But as we have 
seen, Section 230(c)(1) has been interpreted to ensure that this 
protection extends not only to bystanders who attempt to help, but also 
to bystanders who do nothing. Worse yet, it also extends to people 
who are not bystanders at all, but actual participants in harmful 
conduct. That is, Section 230 treats the priest, the Levite, and the 
robbers the same as the Good Samaritan. In doing so, Section 230 not 
only fails to encourage good behavior, but incentivizes evil behavior.  
 
There is another, often overlooked layer to the story of the Good 
Samaritan that offers even more insight into the gap between the Law 
of Cyberspace and the Law of the Good Samaritan. The occasion for 
the parable is a somewhat peculiar exchange between Jesus and a 
lawyer. The lawyer wishes to know what he must do to attain eternal 
life. Jesus responds, “What is written in the law? How do you read it?” 
The lawyer answers, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your 
heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, with all your mind, and 
your neighbor as yourself.” Jesus affirms that this is the correct 
answer, but the lawyer is not satisfied, asking “Who is my neighbor?” 
It is at that point that Jesus relates the story of the Good Samaritan, 
which concludes by Jesus asking the lawyer, “Now which of these 
three do you think seemed to be a neighbor to him who fell among the 
robbers?" The lawyer replies, “He who showed mercy on him,” and 
Jesus says, “Go and do likewise.”48  
 
The answer to the question “Who is my neighbor?” is not, as it is often 
assumed, the man beaten by robbers. In that conventional reading, the 
 
 
 
 
47 Luke 10:31 (New International Version).  
48 Luke 10:30–37 (New International Version).  
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moral of the story is that we should have compassion for those in need, 
even if we are in no way responsible for it. But as Jesus leads the 
lawyer to conclude, the neighbor—the person whom the lawyer must 
love as himself—is the Samaritan. The significance of this is made 
apparent by considering the longstanding enmity, recounted in several 
other New Testament passages, between Jews and Samaritans. By 
naming a member of a despised group as the neighbor in the parable, 
Jesus demonstrates the rigor of true compassion.  
 
The deeper insight of the story of the Good Samaritan is that to love 
one’s neighbor is to love the one you have been taught to hate. 
Whatever you would wish to be done to you, you should wish the 
same to be done to them—good or ill. This principle of reciprocity can 
be found in religions that precede Christianity, as well as in 
philosopher Immanuel Kant’s famous “categorical imperative,” which 
he considered to be the one indispensable moral rule: “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.”49 A version of it can be found as well 
in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.50  
 
It is worthwhile to ponder what the Internet might look like if it were 
truly governed by the Law of the Good Samaritan. It is possible to 
imagine an online world that rewards compassion and responsibility, 
that harnesses technology’s tremendous powers of communication and 
connection to enlarge our humanity, and that urges us to take care of 
not only our own tribe but of anyone in need. 
 
But instead of encouraging the noblest goals of the law, the Law of 
Cyberspace fundamentally unmakes the law. There is no obvious 
stopping point to the Internet’s erosion, and in some cases eradication, 
of settled legal principles of immunity, complicity, free speech, 
criminal law, and tort. 
 
 
 
 
 
49 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (1982). 
50 See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 199-204 (2019).                 
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Back in 1996, Judge Easterbrook warned that the “Law of 
Cyberspace” lacked the capacity to illuminate the entire law.51 More 
than two decades later, we must reckon with its capacity to destroy it. 
 
 
 
 
51 See Easterbrook, supra note 1. 
